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Motto:
Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one.
Albert Einstein
INTRODUCTION
 “Humans constantly seek to establish what is real 
and to achieve a valid and reliable understanding of the 
world” – says Gerald Echterhoff in his foreword to a special 
number of Social Cognition, dedicated to shared reality 
(2010, p. 273). We gladly accept this phrase as our own. 
The most optimistic part is the fact that the basic question: 
“What is real?” is no longer the domain of philosophers, 
and some outsiders. It is also known, that on their way to 
understand the world people make mistakes and are very 
often biased (see Brycz, 2004). One of the manifestations 
of this bias is the False Consensus Effect (FCE), meaning 
a tendency to project own views and preferences to other 
people, i.e., to overestimate the number of people, who 
share our views, choices or behaviours. Starting with the 
research of Ross, Greene and House (1977), the occurrence 
of FCE was confirmed in most research, regardless of their 
specific subject and the sort of group researched. This raises 
the question whether the effect also appears in reference 
to ontological decisions. Ontological here would mean 
connected with existence or non-existence, way of existing 
or a degree of existence.  
 The presented article is rather not typical, it is partly 
empirical and mostly theoretical one. Our main intention 
(which can be seen rather in the background of our efforts) 
is to make a bridge between questions considered usually 
as philosophical ones and the empirical approach, or more 
exactly – between so called “experimental philosophy” 
(Alexander, 2012) and empirical psychology.  Nevertheless, 
the objective of our research was to establish whether FCE 
also occurs when making decisions about the issue: “What 
is more real: Cracow City1, the Universe2 or Me myself?” 
We were also interested whether FCE in middle-aged adults 
(40-60 years old) will be as strong as with students, i.e., 
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young adults (19-24 years old). The research done so far 
(i.a., Yinon, Mayraz & Fox, 1994), suggest that FCE is 
weaker with older people. It may be expected that with 
age, people extend also their knowledge about “individual 
difference”, because they have had more opportunities to 
interact with considerably different persons, and - in the 
consequence  - they have became less egocentric. If so, that 
the false consensus should be weaker in that group than 
among young people.  
 Starting with the research, we have known very 
little about people’s ontological preferences,  i.e., what 
decisions are the most common and on what factors it 
depends.  Apart from FCE and their magnitude, we would get 
more information on distribution of ontological preferences, 
which problem still seems to us very interesting per se. 
We should add, that due to the lack of similar studies, the 
research is of pilot character.  
 When assessing reality, should we expect a far-
reaching factual consensus (which leaves little space for 
false consensus), or should we expect a large variations 
of opinions and an unsubstantiated belief in their common 
occurrence? Contradictory intuitions are possible in this 
matter. On the one hand, we might claim that in basic 
matters, people tend to agree, at least in a given culture 
circle. We might expect that being immersed in the same 
culture is a factor that uniforms our views on existence 
or non-existence of broadly understood “objects”. On the 
other hand, looking at the problem through the prism of 
individual differences, we might expect differences between 
people to be so universal, that they should also appear in this 
case.  
 Let us also notice, that ontological issues are 
rarely a matter of everyday discourse. It might be so, 
because that makes for a difficult conversation topic. Apart 
from that, until the interlocutors are immersed in common 
psychology, possible view exchanges might be interpreted 
differently. They might be interpreted in categories of norm 
and abnormality, without searching for difference in views 
and varied ontological preferences. No occasion for such 
discourse should make it more difficult to correct self-
imagination in reference to other people’s ideas, which, 
could, consequently, strengthen the volume of the effect. 
Perhaps due to their illusory obviousness, ontological 
preferences are rarely also the subject of psychological 
research. First, let’s discuss some issues connected to 
the way ontology is understood and let us sketch a way 
of thinking connected to the answer to “What is real?” 
question. We will form some arguments supporting gradual 
point of view, or the reasons to perceive “being real” in 
gradual terms (less vs. more) rather than zero-one (real vs. 
non-real). Further on, we will remember some findings and 
interpretative hypotheses about FCE, formulated within a 
couple of decades’ worth of the effect research, starting with 
the classic work The ‘false consensus effect’. An egocentric 
bias in social perception and attribution processes (Ross, 
Greene & House, 1977).  
ONTOLOGICAL ISSUES IN QUALITY AND 
QUANTITY PERSPECTIVE 
 Some psychologists, upon heating the word 
“ontology” feel slightly confused, since they believe that 
they have found a philosophical text. Being researchers, they 
do not want to divulge into “metaphysical speculations”. 
Yet ontology does not have to be something strange, weird 
and dissuasive. Referring to Wilhelm Gotfried Leibniz 
(Couturat,1903, p. 512), we may consider ontology as 
“science of something and of nothing, of being and not 
being and the mode of thing, of substance and accident”. 
To put it differently, ontology could take care of deciding 
the matters connected with existence, non-existence and 
different modes of existence (of what we believe to exist 
in a way). In modern times, Gruber (1993) put it extremely 
simply, saying that “ontology is an explicit specification of 
a conceptualization”.  
 It should be noted, that apart from more or less 
traditionally understood general ontology, we presently 
talk more often about specific ontologies – specific for 
a given branch of knowledge. It is not hard to notice, 
that a complete and unambiguous conceptualization, or 
ontology, is required by databases, library, www or mental 
illness catalogues (Ceusters & Smith, 2010), geographical 
interest objects, etc. Ontology also slowly enters the social 
sciences area, especially at the borderline of technology 
and education (Chen, 2009), psychology, i.a., in the context 
of stress and emotions (Robichaud, 2003; Yan, Bracewell, 
Ren & Kuroiwa, 2008; Khoozani & Hadzic, 2010), or even 
social work (Aymer & Okitikpi, 2010).  
 If ontology is understood as a systematic and 
complete conceptualization – of reality as such, or only 
of its narrow, specific part, it is then of explicit character, 
presuming the presence of idea categorisation processes. It 
would be a mistake, however, to narrow down ontological 
issues to a verbal-idea level and explicit choices, articulated in 
language. Opting for the broader understanding of ontology, 
we may divide all ontological decisions (ones that presume 
existence or non-existence of something) into explicit and 
implicit ones. If somebody is planning something, i.e., what 
they will do on 12 September 2016, then they act as if they 
assumed that their mode of existence, or their “ontological 
status” is not going to change in the meantime, as if both 
will not cease to exist. Similarly, if somebody, driven by 
internal motivation, starts praying, then this move is dictated 
by  ontological belief about the existence of a higher power 
and its potential influence to the events important to them. 
Each of those examples contains an ontological decision, 
manifesting in observable behaviour, although the decisions 
may be taken spontaneously and on the basis of unclear 
criteria, which is difficult to define precisely. They are often 
based on subjective beliefs or feelings, for which we cannot 
say when and why they appeared, but we still keep acting as 
if they were valid and based on solid premises. The implicit 
ontology, which anchors our spontaneous behavioural 
decisions,  seems more interesting from psychological point 
of view than intellectually declared  worldviews. 
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 In typical situations of everyday life, we 
spontaneously refer to different ontological orientations, 
depending on the context. Probably, we most often use the 
vision of reality called by Lawrence LeShan (1977) sensoric 
mode of being, when we make decisions about existence 
or non-existence of something, based on sensory evidence 
and reducing the reality to a physical, spatial and temporal 
world image. However, very often we succumb to the 
illusion that  we  act on the basis of the sensory data when 
the exact opposite takes place. The testimony of senses is 
more frequently subservient to our beliefs, than a right in 
itself.   We rather see what we know, than know what we 
see. 
 And so, in the study kept in Piaget clinical 
experiment convention (Mudyń, 2000), the test participants 
first chose among 4 element idea set, which refers (in their 
opinion) to something most real. In the next step, they chose 
the idea relating to the least real “object”. It turned out, that 
people who considered a given object for the most “real”, 
when asked to substantiate their choice, frequently reach 
for the sensoric arguments, in belief, that they see, feel and 
experience its existence at all. Things were reverse with 
objects considered “least real”. To specify: if among the 
set: the Universe, Me myself, Cracow City, Planet Neptune, 
somebody chose the Universe as the most real object and 
Me myself as the least real object, they said in justification 
of their viewpoint, for instance: “We can see the Universe, 
but not ourselves – we need a mirror for that” (M, aged 
19). If somebody believed the Universe to be the least real 
(which happened relatively more often), they also claimed 
sensory data in their justification, but in a different way. As 
in, for example: “I have no contact with it […] I have never 
seen it, it’s too big” (M, aged 22). Similarly, in the case of 
a different idea set. The people who believed that the most 
real object is “God-creator” were willingly using sensoric 
arguments, saying, for instance, “I can see the results of 
his actions everyday” (M, aged 22), “I feel the presence 
of God all the time” (F, aged 24), “I feel his hand, he has 
control over everything” (M, aged 22). Whereas people, 
who thought that “God-creator” refers to something least 
real frequently referred to lack of sensoric justification – “I 
haven’t seen him, I have not felt his presence” (F, aged 20). 
 To sum up, the presence of sensoric arguments (I 
can see, hear, feel, etc.) referred to all objects, but it was not 
a consequence of their specificity or concrete nature, only a 
result of belief in their reality.  
 For the sake of the presented text, let us assume 
that “to exist” is “to be real” and to negate the existence 
of something, is to believe that it is unreal. Adopting such 
an attitude allows us to draw close traditionally understood 
ontology and common language and, consequently, allows 
us to make an empirical problem out of ontological issues. 
Let us note that the question: “What is real for who?” is not 
a philosophical question, but a psychological or sociological 
one. In order to tackle this question empirically, we do not 
have to solve a philosophical dilemma: “What is truly 
real?” or “What really exists and what does not?” Unlike 
philosophers, the representatives of social sciences must be 
interested in “subjective realities” of different people, even 
if due to simple behavioural and social consequences.  
 Those “subjective worlds” may appear unimportant, 
since until we are immersed in our “subjective reality”, 
we simply treat it as unquestionable, and thus objective 
(Mudyń, 2007). Or at least do that in greatest majority of 
standard situations, to which we react in a spontaneous, 
automated way.  
 The issue of “subjective realities”, or rather a 
multitude of subjective worlds is still not simple, and 
may not be simple. We need to order it a little bit, thus 
simplifying it. But first we must see its complexity. With 
wishful thinking, it would be convenient to accept that 
all can be divided into two zero-one categories: real and 
unreal or existing and non-existing. Regardless of where 
we put the line between real and unreal, our interlocutor 
could easily protest. They might remark, that if we start 
a discussion about “unreal things”, thus making them an 
object of a discourse, then we bring them into existence, at 
least as a content of the discourse. And what are we to do 
with fiction, or rather different kinds of fiction? Is Sherlock 
Holmes (for instance) somebody real? Rather not3, although 
we know who he is and what he’s like and there are many 
monuments reminding about his existence, including the 
Sherlock Holmes Museum in London on Baker Street 220b. 
Popular ontology tempts us to use simple divisions into facts 
vs. myths, in order to juxtapose the real with the fictional. 
We cannot yield to that temptation, since there are many 
arguments pointing to the fact, that fiction is an important 
part of every social reality. Also the one we are living in, 
the one we are immersed in. Fiction is not just dwarves, 
dragons and characters from Greek mythology. It is also 
ideologies and world views, the existence of which is a fact, 
but substance of which cannot be equalled to “empirical 
facts”.  
 Since fiction exists in some manner, there might 
occur an idea to differentiate various types of existence 
or “levels of existence”. Different ways of existence or 
different versions of “being real” might be named and 
ordered. History of philosophy convinces us that the 
idea, otherwise substantiated, was taken up and put to 
life by different philosophers, starting with Aristotle, who 
differentiated ten idea categories, i.e.: substance, quantity, 
quality, relation, place, time, location, state, action, being 
affected (Aristotle, 1990, p. 34). On the other hand, Wilhelm 
Wundt (1906), proposed to reduce basic categories to four: 
objects, characteristics, states and relations. This way or 
another, until we focus on differences, trying to include all 
elements, aspects or manifestations of reality in a finished 
set of varied idea categories, we might say we do qualitative 
ontology. Further on, we might “sharpen” earlier established 
categories (by specifying the criteria of belonging to a 
given category), making a step towards formal ontology. 
This direction of search and the problems, are better left to 
3 Although the research comissioned by a UKTV Gold television station on a sample of 3000 British people in 2008 demonstrated that for 53% of test 
participants Sherlock Holmes is a historical figure and then very real … http://uktv.couk/gold/stepbystep/aid/598605 (Retrieved 28 February 2008). 
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other researchers, especially those, who construct detailed 
ontologies, allowing for description of content in specific 
areas of reality or human activity.  
ONTOLOGY FROM QUANTITATIVE  
PERSPECTIVE
 The attention of the authors is absorbed by a 
different, complementary question: “Is it possible and is 
it justified to think of what is real in quantitative terms?” 
To simplify: is “quantitative ontology” possible? Could 
we not skip or minimise idea categories, thus bypassing 
disputes born from inevitable arbitrariness of the proposed 
solutions? Can something seem (subjectively) more real than 
something else? We think, yes. Here are some arguments. 
Let us start with the simplest and the most obvious.  
 As we know, we are ready to ascribe different 
subjective probability to future events, i.e., who will win in 
the presidential election, will unemployment decrease next 
year, will the spring come sooner, etc. Popular language 
allows us to equal an event’s subjective probability and the 
evaluation of its reality. If we believe that “tomorrow will 
be another day”, we treat this assumed event as something 
very real and we act as if this future event was indeed an 
element of the reality. If we judge probability of an event for 
below 5%, we might say it seems rather unreal to us. If we 
disbelieve the existence of something completely, we say 
it’s unreal. On other occasions, confronted with unexpected 
but subiectively very important facts,  people react in style 
of: “I know, but I still cannot believe it”. So even thought I 
know (on the intellectual level), it still seems unreal for me. 
 We may, of course differentiate various “modes of 
existence”, different levels or kind of reality. Until we do 
so, we are within the convention of qualitative ontology. 
If we dare to order those, previously enumerated, “modes 
of being” by intensity of existence, or by the answer to 
the question, what exists more and what less, we are 
introducing quantitative aspect to ontological studies. This 
direction of thinking appears in the pages of philosophy 
history as gradualism. It assumed a kind of gradualisation 
of entities, from those which exist the most and in a way 
unconditioned by anything (the Absolute) to those which 
exist in a weaker sense of this word, in a relative manner. 
This direction of thinking is connected with the names of 
Philon of Alexandria (10 B.C.-40 A.D.), Origen (186-254 
A.D.) or Avicenna (980-1037 A.D.).  
 Apart from individual concepts of those 
philosopher, we may, for our own use, specify this point 
of view, referring to different criteria which order (and 
thus evaluate) different modes of existence. Some of those 
may correspond to “ontological intuition” of some people 
and manifest themselves when life decisions are made. We 
may, for instance refer to the time of duration as a criterion, 
believing that what is eternal is more existent than what 
(only) exists in a limited time space. We may look for a 
criterion of “existence intensity” in the degree of autonomy 
in relation to the rest of the Universe; then the more 
autonomic, less conditioned by the outside circumstances 
object would be more real out of two objects compared. 
 Quantitative approach to ontology issues does not 
depreciate qualitative ontology, focusing on differences 
in types of existence. If we believe in the existence of a 
common denominator for all “existences”, or all forms of 
being, we may, if need be, abstract form the differences, or 
from quality. We easily differentiate, for instance, machines 
from vegetables or works of art. Nevertheless, from the 
viewpoint of a truck driver or a bridge-designing engineer, 
it’s the weight of the load and bridge strength that matter - 
the sort of items being transported is unimportant. We ought 
to think, that in many situations, when analytic information 
processing is not “turned on” because of various reasons 
and we react to different signals spontaneously, the kind of 
reaction (decision) depends more on the quantity of data 
on a given subject, than on content specificity. Sometime 
the number of associations is more important than their 
content.. Whereas social polls about, for instance, trust for 
individual politicians suggest that “the degree of familiarity” 
resulting from frequency of exposure influences not only 
their popularity, but also (which is not very rational) the 
degree of trust, respect etc.  
FALSE CONSENSUS EFFECT (FCE).  
SOME FINDINGS, SOME INTERPRETATIONS
 The classic article The false consensus effect: 
An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution 
processes (Ross, Greene & House, 1977) was published 
quite some time ago.  Numerous research (the peak of which 
was in 1990s) and metaanalyses (Marks & Miller, 1987; 
Gross & Miller, 1997; Yinon, Mayraz & Fox, 2001) prove 
that FCE is a rather universal phenomenon, independent on, 
sex, age, nationality of participants and test methods used. 
Symptoms signalled then i.e., that it occurs only among 
adolescents, especially those, who study psychology (Sears, 
1986), turned out to be useless. Apart from the research 
conducted on students, the “egocentric bias” also showed 
up in research done on many other specific groups, such as 
nurses, chronic mental patients, elderly adults (70-93), as 
demonstrated by Yinon, Mayraz and Fox (1994), nationally 
representative telephone survey (N=1251) in Switzerland 
(Morrison & Matthes, 2011) and many others. It seems that 
conclusions drawn by the author of the first metaanalysis 
Mullen, Atkins, Champion et. al. (1985), on the basis of 
115 experiments have not lost much of their validity (see 
also Marks & Miller, 1987; Mullen & Hu, 1988). Those 
authors believed, that the results are independent on the 
group researched and kind of questions (choices made). 
However, false consensus effect appeared dependant on 
the number of questions the test participants answered (it 
decreased with the number of questions) and on the order 
of questions asked (it decreased when test participants first 
estimated answers of others and only then marked their own 
preferences).  FCE concerns not only views (i.e., Wojciszke, 
2006 ), but also preferences (i.e., Gilovich, 1990), attitudes 
(Crano, 1983; Sherman, Chassin, Presson & Agnostinelli, 
1984; Fabrigar & Krosnick, 1995), prejudices against others 
(Watt & Larkin, 2010), desirable or undesirable situations 
(McFarland & Miller, 1990), behaviours (Ross, Greene & 
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House, 1977; Suls, Wan & Sanders, 1988; van der Pligt, 
1984) and performance outcomes (Alicke & Largo, 1995). 
 Already within the first 10 years there appeared 
several interpretative hypotheses of the effect, such as: 
1) selective exposure4 to stimuli (we meet people of the 
same views more often), 2) higher cognitive accessibility 
of own views than others’, 3) way of situation information 
processing, connected with basic attribution mistake, 
4) motivational factors, justifying the popularity of our 
own views and preferences. Belonging to minority, as we 
know, often results in negative social consequences, and 
overestimating universality of own views settles us in the 
feeling that they are right and increases or protects self-
esteem. We ought to agree with 1987 metaanalysis authors 
(Marks & Miller, 1987), that the hypotheses mentioned are 
rather complementary than exclusive.  
 Some time later attempts were made to question 
range of this effect and undermine the validity of its name, 
suggesting that the consensus effect is not that “false”, and 
using own preferences as suggestions when estimating the 
preferences of others, especially with no feedback ought to 
be considered a rational acting strategy.  
 A conclusion of next metaanalysis authors is 
especially inspiring.  This metaanalysis was based on the 
results of 128 research (Gross & Miller, 1997), and stated 
that perceived consensus of own preferences and presumed 
preferences of others depends on the volume of actual 
consensus.  Borderline value under which overestimating 
or underestimating of the social consensus starts would be 
the “golden ratio”, i.e., an actual consensus on the level of 
61, 8%. Therefore we could say, the consensus perceived is 
distorted in two directions, so as to get maximally close to 
the golden ratio (the same that is used for a golden division 
of a segment and ratio of a shorter rectangle side to the 
longer). Let us also note, that the right proportion also 
appears in the context of the famous Fibbonaci sequence 
where quotient of previous number divided by the next 
number is close to the φ value or the golden ratio (Corbolan, 
2010). It turns out that the traces of the golden ratio may be 
found not only in masterpieces of paintings (starting with 
the Mona Lisa by Leonardo da Vinci), in architecture or 
in rectangular credit cards, but more importantly, in nature 
itself. We may find it in the so called logarithmic spiral, 
visible in the snail shell shape or a blooming rose or event 
in proportions of left-winding spiral to right-winding spiral 
in which the sunflower seeds are set (Corbolan, op. cit., p. 
9-17). 
 If the golden ratio also refers to the false consensus 
effect as well as aesthetic and natural preferences of 
constructions created in nature by plants and animals, it may 
mean that FCE is not just a psycho-social phenomenon, it 
is rather a manifestation of a more universal rule present in 
the natural world. 
 Taking into account that FCE is a psychological 
construct, it is understandable, that the occurrence of that 
effect and its range is being explained by referring to other 
psychological concepts. Trying to explain a well documented 
fact that FCE increases with minority options, i.e., the less 
people actually share our opinion or preference, the more 
ready we are to overestimate its popularity. Here, authors 
invoke motivational arguments (ego defence, self-esteem 
increase), and cognitive arguments (minorities, which 
frequently represent radical opinions or rare preferences are 
more salient and harder to miss). Bogdan Wojciszke (2001), 
on the other hand, on the basis of abortion allowability 
research results, performed twice on Polish national 
sample of 1050 people, proposes a term “belligerent 
minority syndrome”. This syndrome includes, apart 
from overestimating popularity of own (minority) views 
occurrence, also a stronger belief about their righteousness 
and moral superiority. All interpretations mentioned, 
although seemingly justified, have a common denominator 
- they refer to social and psychological phenomena and 
constructs. We may not yet rule out the possibility, that all 
psychological correlates are a manifestation of a deeper 
mechanism or rule, the nature and universality of which 
exceeds psychology.  
 The research done shows that if the actual 
consensus is high, FCE disappears, or turns into its 
opposite, false uniqueness. Let us hypothetically assume 
that in an alleged research where test participants would 
decide whether they prefer sweet or salted grapes, 95% 
of the group would opt for sweet grapes. In that situation, 
even if all test participants (which is not very probable) had 
a tendency to overestimate their preferences and believed 
that 100% of the population shares them, FCE could not 
manifest, since the difference between actual and estimated 
consensus could not exceed 5% due to mathematical 
reasons. Let us further note that the imagination of salt 
grape lovers would be in an opposite situation -  it would be 
impossible to underestimate frequency of own preferences, 
whereas overestimating (when the decision is made in the 
area of 95%) is both possible and also quite probable. It 
is then hard not to agree with the conclusion proposed in 
the title of a classic article (Mullen & Smith, 1989), that, 
above all, FCE is a function of an actual consensus. It seems 
that the question: How to separate mathematical reasons 
(regression to mean) from psychological ones still remains 
open. 
 Ontological question, as far as they do not 
overlap with religious issues and do not concern the 
belief in existence or non existence of the God are rarely 
disputed. As a consequence, they also have at their disposal 
a minimal amount of information about other people’s 
views on this issue. This circumstance may make it harder 
to correct own imaginations about other people’s views, 
which, consequently, may increase the size of FCE. On the 
other hand, the deficit of the information at hand and the 
uncertainty connected with it may provoke people to assess 
social consensus more carefully, and lead to FCE weakening 
or its reduction. The main objective of the research was, to 
dispel that doubt.  
4 We should also remember the selective disclosure phenomenon, which consists of disclosing only those opinions, which we expect to be consistent 
with our intelocutor’s views (Kitts, 2003
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METHOD
 The first study was conducted in a group of 
psychology students, then replicated in two different group 
– mathematics students (study 2) and middle-aged people 
(study 3). The procedure was the same in all three groups.
 In the first stage test participants were confronted 
with the original projection method Real-Non(real) (RN-
02), which is used to assess the so-called life orientations, 
and to provide the answer to the question: What is the most 
important for an individual? The method is designed (Mudyń, 
2010) as a projective tool, in which – instead of answering 
a direct question – the subject has to decide what kind of 
abstract object seems to her/him the most real (from among 
the concepts presented in the set). The RN-02 Inventory 
consists of 58 sets of concepts referring to various objects 
and aspects of human activity. These sets are configurations 
of concepts belonging to different ontological orientations. 
Each concept appears three times in different sets.  Six 
ontological orientations refer to Spranger’s typology of 
values, which are: economic, theoretical, aesthetic, social, 
political, and religious. It should be stressed that one set 
of concepts is unique as it consists of notions which do not 
belong to any of the distinguished life orientations, and 
furthermore – which is an exception – content elements of 
this set were always the same, i.e., Cracow City, Me myself, 
the Universe. This distinctive set appears three times, and 
what changes is the order of particular concepts.  
 There are some premises lying behind the method. 
It is assumed that: 1) If something is important for an 
individual, it seems for him/her more real, in comparison to 
things which are relatively unimportant or indifferent to him/
her, 2) The term “reality” (or something real) is by nature 
very indefinite and even ambiguous, so it must be specified 
by an individual user, 3) This means that “reality” itself 
is a kind of projective stimulus, which must be somehow 
interpreted by the user. 4) There is interdependence between 
the dominant ontological orientation and preferred values; 
this primarily applies to implicit values.  
 Generally, ontological orientation can be 
understood as the individual’s tendency to selectively 
concentrate on a specific aspect of his/her own life activity 
(economic, social, religious, etc.), which leads to the belief 
in the high reality of given references in the external world. 
 The presented text focuses on one of the method’s 
elements, which is choosing the most real element three 
times form the set of: Cracow City, the Universe and Me 
myself. It should be noted, that the kind of choices made 
in this set is not counted in results of any aforementioned 
life orientations. This set is an additional, complementary 
element of the   RN-02.  
 In the second stage of the study, with reference 
to three items (which are in fact different versions of the 
same question) of the questionnaire completed before, test 
participants were asked to assess the percentage of people 
in your class5 who probably reached similar conclusions. In 
one of the groups – as part of post factum control procedure 
– test participants were asked to recall what (in the case 
of this set) made them pick out the most real object. The 
researchers were particularly interested in the responses of 
those subjects whose choices were inconsistent.  
Study 1
Participants
 First-year psychology students took part in this 
research as part of their course on Cognitive Processes. 
There were 116 participants, including 97 women (84,0%) 
and 19 men (16.0%) aged 19-24 (M=20.2; SD=1.2).  
Method
 Test participants completed a specific type of 
questionnaire, i.e., RN-02 Inventory, in which they had to 
indicate in each set a concept which, according to them, 
refers to something more real than the other concepts. After 
that, test participants were provided with the following 
written instructions: In the questionnaire which you have 
completed, among other sets from which you were choosing 
the most real “object”, one set appeared three times: 
Cracow City, the Universe, Me myself.  In your opinion, 
what percentage of people in your class made the same 
choices as you did in this set? 
 Finally, in order to obtain information about 
cognitive processes accompanying the questionnaire 
completion, each person was asked to take a stance on the 
following two issues:  
1. Write down what made you choose a particular 
object in this set as the most real?  
2. If in another encounter with the same set, your 
choice was different, recall what made you pick out 
something else than before.  
Results6
 
 It must be remembered that test participants who 
were examined three times made a choice from a set of 
three concepts, in which only their order changed. Although 
most people (about 80%) made their choices consistently, 
some respondents changed their preferences in another 
encounter with the same set. Theoretically speaking, there 
are ten different configurations of the options provided. 
They have been enumerated in Table 1, which presents 
the number (and percent) of people in the group, who 
made particular choices, as well as the average estimated 
percentage of people who, according to test participants, 
picked the same options. Let’s remember that there were 
different configurations of choices.  
 The obtained results, i.e., the percentage of 
respondents making particular choices (actual consensus), 
5 In the third group (people in midle age) we used expression “in your age”).
6 Some of the results submitted in this article were also presented at the International Conference “Motivation i Social Contexts: Theory and 
Practice”(30.06-02.07.2013, Cracow). 
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as well as the estimated consensus (the percentage of 
subjects who made the same choices) are presented in Table 
1. Student’s t-distribution was used to compare the mean 
from the group with the assumed mean (the actual frequency 
in the population). If the number of people representing a 
particular variant of choices was smaller than 8, t-value was 
not calculated.  
 The first three configurations of choices can be 
described as consistent choices, while others (4-10) as 
inconsistent choices (mixed), in which test participants 
at another attempt chose a different object than before. 
In total 21 respondents made inconsistent choices, which 
constitutes 18% of the sample group.  
 With reference to Table 1, it should be noted 
that a similar percentage of test participants consistently 
picked Cracow City and Me myself – 39.8% and 37,.1% 
respectively. But only 4.2% of test participants chose the 
Universe as the most real object. It is also worth mentioning 
that three of the possible variants of inconsistent choices, 
namely 4.6 and 9 did not appear in this group.  
 It should be noted that the expected number of 
people making the same choices was overestimated in each 
case, regardless of the configuration.  These discrepancies 
were becoming more conspicuous, at times even spectacular, 
in the case of less popular options (variants 2, 5, 7, 9 and 
10). It must be ascertained then that FCE occurs also with 
reference to ontological issues, and more specifically, when 
assessing the degree of reality of the compared objects. 
Differences between the actual and estimated consensus, 
in the case of accordingly numerous configurations of 
choices (1, 3 and 5), proved to be significant at least on level 
p <.0001.  
 As for test participants’ responses, which were 
obtained post factum and referred to the first question (what 
were you guided by when choosing in this set a particular 
object as the most real), they were convergent. Like in 
previous studies, in which attempts were made to determine 
the criteria behind choices made, test participants willingly 
referred to “the testimony of the senses”, i.e., sensory data. 
It might be said that they tend to succumb to illusion, they 
are mainly guided by the testimony of the senses. “The 
main criterion of my assessment was what I can see, notice 
or experience in one way or another” (F, aged 20). Many 
people were convinced that their choices were obvious and 
unquestionable – “There is nothing more real to me than me 
myself” (F, aged 23).  
 In participants’ responses we were trying to find 
also hints on inconsistent choices, when, somebody picked 
(for example) Cracow City for the first time (as the most 
real object), and in the next encounter with the same set, 
something else was chosen, e.g., Me myself.  Did not it 
result from absent-mindedness or other distractions?  
 Generally, it can be said that the very process of 
making choices out of the changing  sets of concepts forced 
test participants to modify their original understanding of 
reality, leading them to expand the preliminary, intuitive 
“definition” of reality. Some people indicated that in their 
responses. “Cracow appears to me to be something very 
real because it is what surrounds me and where I am almost 
every day. It was my first association and my first choice. 
But the second time I had doubts. I was considering whether 
I should pick Me myself this time. I did it the third time 
because I decided that as a matter of fact, it is I who is the 
most real in Cracow City” (M, aged 24). Another person 
TABLE 1. Comparison between the actual and estimated consensus in the group of psychology students, including 




















Cracow City The Universe Me myself
1 3x - - 47 39.83% 56.64% .0001
2 - 3x - 5 4.24% 35.4% -
3 - - 3x 43 37.07% 60.36% .00001
4 2x 1x - - - - -
5 2x - 1x 8 6.7% 52.88% .0001
6 1x 2x - - - - -
7 1x - 2x 5 4.24% 40.0% -
8 - 2x 1x - - - -
9 - 1x 2x 5 4.24% 56.25% -
10 1x 1x 1x 3 2.54% 65.0% -
Total 116 100%
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– “Choosing a particular object I was mainly guided by 
whether it is perceived by at least one of the senses (and 
preferably by all of them), if it is tangible, visible, etc. At the 
moment of changing my choice I was under the impression 
that another object is more real and discernible” (F, aged 
22). Taking into consideration the responses of those who 
made “inconsistent” choices, as well as the direction of 
changes (these people usually started with Cracow City and 
finished with Me myself), one gets the impression that some 
people recall their own existence with some delay. The 
process of searching for the most real is usually oriented 
by an implicit assumption that reality is in a way something 
“external”.  
 No significant differences were noted in the FCE 
magnitude connected with test participants’ gender. In 
the case of women, FCE was found to be slightly higher 
(M=25.3%) than in the case of men (M=22.7), no statistically 
significant difference.  
 Considering that psychology students – as is often 
believed – are a specific group because they devote more 
attention and reflection to human behaviours and cognitive 
processes, it was decided that the same study would be 
replicated in a different group: first-year mathematics 
students of AGH University of Science and Technology 
(AGH - UST) in Cracow.  The mathematics students, as 
we can observe while having classes with them, manifest 
different cognitive styles and different interests than 
psychology students. They are also more familiar with 
operating number vales, assessing probability inclusive. 
That is why we expected they may differ (from psychology 
students) also while assessing the consensus. Moreover, as 
pointed out in another research, the profile of education may 
be important – students of physics differ significantly from 
law students in their ontological choices (Mudyń,  2007 
Study 2
Participants 
 First-year mathematics students of AGH – UST, 
126 people (60 women and 66 men) aged 19-22 (M=19.3; 
SD=0.9). Studies were carried out individually or in small 
groups on university premises.  
The method
 Similar as in the first study. Test participants 
completed RN-02 Inventory, then they estimated the 
percentage of students in their year who made the same 
choices as they did in the recurring set: Cracow City, the 
Universe, Me myself. This time researchers did not use a 
control procedure concerning the criteria taken into account 
while making choices. 
Results
 Results, that is the type and frequency of choices 
made and estimated percentage of respondents choosing in 
the same way, are presented in Table 2.  
(two-sided)
 It should be noted (Table 2) that regardless of the 
choice variant, the estimated consensus was clearly higher 
than the actual one. This time detailed information about the 
type of inconsistent choices was not provided, although just 
like in the previous group, discrepancies between the actual 
and estimated frequency of particular configurations were 
even  bigger than in case of consistent choices.  In the case 
of some type of inconsistent choices (what is not presented 
in Table 2), where the size of particular subgroups was big 
enough, FCE turned out to be significant on level p =.001 




















Cracow City The Universe Me myself
1 3x - - 40 31.7% 51.9% .001
2 - 3x - 14 11.1% 31.3% .02







Total 126 100% -
TABLE 2. Comparison between the actual and estimated consensus in the group of mathematics students, including 
the type of choices
Note. *We have concluded that in case of the inconsistent choices  calculate the average estimated consensus would be problematic or even misleading 
because the particular subjects s estimated their own, specific types of inconsistence (not any types of inconsistent choices)..
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were made by 24 people, which constitutes 19.1% of the 
whole group.  
 A comparison was made between the magnitude 
of women’s and men’s FCE. Similarly as in the previous 
group, an average false consensus effect among women 
(M=31.1%) was found to be higher than among men 
(M=21.8%). This time differences between mean values 
turned out to be significant – t(124)=2,03; p <.05. 
Study 3
Participants 
 The study involved 106 people (53 men and 53 
women) aged 40-60 (M=49.6; SD=4.6). This group, which 
was diverse in many respects, included people living in 
Cracow City or small towns in southern Poland, having 
different jobs and representing various levels of education. 
The method
 Similar as in the previous studies, but test 
participants estimated the universality of their choices with 
reference to the population categorized as “people of your 
age”. Unlike in previous studies, where the question was 
about the estimated frequency of one’s own choice “in your 
year class”, this time there is no direct measure of the actual 
consensus with reference to people belonging to this age 
group. So, we assumed that the distribution of results in 
the sample can be used as the acceptable  estimator of the 
distribution in the population of middle-aged people.  
Results
 Results concerning the actual and estimated 
frequency of choices are presented in Table 3.  
 As we can see (Table 3) similarly as in the previous 
two groups, the estimated consensus was higher than the 
actual one, regardless of choice type, for both consistent and 
(especially) inconsistent choices. This time the percentage 
of respondents making inconsistent choices was slightly 
smaller (10,4%) than in the group of mathematics students. 
Differences between the actual group consensus and the 
estimated consensus are statistically significant from 
p < .01 in the case of people choosing the Universe, 
p < .001 in the case of subjects picking out Me myself, and 
p < .00001 for those opting for Cracow City.  
 Also a comparison was made between the 
magnitude of women’s and men’s FCE.  Although women’s 
FCE was slightly higher (M=22.7) than in the case of men 
(M=19.9), the difference is not significant.  
Summary of results obtained in three test groups 
(psychology students, mathematics students 
and middle-aged adults) 
 Let’s start with emphasis on what is common in 
the results of the tested groups.  In each group some part of 
people made inconsistent, mixed ontological choices when 
answering the questions about which of the three named 
“objects“ seems to be most real. In the successive groups 
these answers were accordingly: 18, 0%, 19, 1% and 10, 4% 
of the respondents. In all groups regardless the kind of the 
choices made the estimated consensus was overestimated 
without exception.  In all cases where the number of 
people making the certain choice allowed estimating the 
significance of the difference, these differences appeared 
to be statistically significant at the confidence level p =.02 
through p < .01 and p < .001 up to p < .00001 inclusive. In 
all groups (if taking into account consistent choices) the 
least often chosen object was the Universe. In all groups 
FCE was slightly higher in women than men (and among 
the mathematics student this difference appeared to be 




















Cracow City The Universe Me myself
1 3x - - 35 33.0% 56.6% .0000
2 - 3x - 9 8.5% 46.3% .01








TABLE 3. Comparison between the actual and estimated consensus in the group of, middle-aged people including 
the type of choices
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 7/13/15 9:18 AM
169On the false ontological consensus
 For further comparisons it can be helpful to use the 
pooled Table 4, including only the corresponding values in 
relation to so-called the consistent choices.  
 With reference to Table 4 it is worth to note that 
the middle-aged adults in comparison with the two student’s 
groups more often chose Me myself as the most real object 
(48,1%). It may be assumed that for the students, due to 
the typical for adolescence identity crisis, the “Self ” is not 
sufficiently crystallized yet and therefore seems to be less 
real.  
 There were the mean values of FCE magnitude 
compared within the tested groups with taking into account 
all possible choices. FCE was calculated in such a way, that 
firstly for each person there was a calculation made for the 
difference between the actual frequency of the adequate type 
of choice within the group (expressed as the percentage) and 
the estimated frequency of such a choice made by a certain 
person, and then the obtained differences were averaged for 
all people in the given group. The carried out ANOVA (3x1) 
didn’t show the differences in FCE magnitude within the 
three compared groups - F(345) =1.07; p = .34.  
 Considering the fact that within each of the tested 
groups some part of people, and accordingly 17.9%, 19.1% 
and 10.4%, made inconsistent choices, it was decided to 
make comparison of FCE magnitudes of inconsistent 
persons with the persons making consistent choices. The 
comparisons were made separately for each of three groups 
by using t-student for the independent groups. The results 
are shown in Figure 1. (See next page)  
 In the first group (psychology students) so-
called inconsistent choices were made by 21 persons and 
consistent choices by 95 ones. The corresponding means 
were M=45,07 (SD=26.79) and M=20.37(SD=23.78); 
t(114)=4.21; p <.00001 . In mathematics student group 
the inconsistent choices were made by 25 persons, and 
consistent ones by 101. The corresponding means are 
M=44.86 (SD=21.60; t(124)=4.27; p <.00001. In the group 
of middle-aged adults the inconsistent choices were made 
by 11 persons, and consistent ones by 95. The corresponding 
means are M=47.48% and M=18.32%; t(104)=3.86; 
p < .0001.7 
 Significant and even spectacularly higher FCE 
among people making inconsistent choices in comparison 
with the people, who chose consistently, as well as 
repetitiveness and stability of theses differences gives food 
for thought. However, it has been known for a long time, 
especially since Gross and Miller (1997) meta-analyses, 
that overestimation of compliance is the issue of minority, 
whereas underestimation (which, according to these authors, 
starts above 61.8% of actual consensus) is the domain of 
majority.  
 When we think about it, the simplest interpretation 
of the evidently higher FCE of inconsistent choices would 
be the justification of this fact with the relative rarity of such 
choices (jointly it refers only to 16.1% of the respondents). 
However, in our research the actual consensus has never 
crossed (or even has been close to) this magical border. 
The relatively highest consensus occurred within middle-
7 Each time one used double-paged test t for the independent groups. Leven’s test showed homogeneousness of variances in both groups; distribution 
of FCE values close to normal. 
Object 
recognised 























City 39.8% 56.6% .0001 31.7% 51.9% .001 33.0% 56.6% .0000
Universe 4.2% 35.4% - 11.1% 31.3% .02 8.5% 46.3% .01
Me myself 37.1% 60.4% .0000 38.1% 61.0% 001 48.1% 59.4% .001
All types of 
inconsistent 
choices  
17.9% - - 19.1% - - 10.4% - -
TABLE 4. Comparison of the actual and estimated consensus within all tested groups in relation to the consistent 
choices
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aged group, where 48.1% of the respondents chose Me 
myself as the most real object. Luckily, we also have at 
our disposal the results of the other “minority”, namely the 
persons that consistently were indicating the Universe as 
the most real object. Such persons (in all groups) amount 
to 28 i.e. (8.1%). Thus, we have decided to compare FCE 
magnitude of “inconsistent persons” with the persons that 
(consistently) were choosing the Universe. The comparison 
of the average FCE magnitude within the mentioned groups 
is shown in the Figure 2.  
 It turns out that in all groups FCE was higher among 
the persons making the inconsistent choices in comparison 
with the persons choosing the Universe, and in case of the 
mathematics students only this difference turned out to 
be significant (t(36)=2.99; p < .01).  Considering the fact, 
that group sizes were small (which in part explains lack of 
significant differences in the remaining groups), there was 
also made a comparison of the average FCE results among 
all inconsistent persons (N=56) with all persons choosing 
the Universe (N=28) jointly i.e., without considering their 
belongingness to the group. The difference turned out to 
be statistically significant. The corresponding values are: 
M=46.09 vs. M=27.80; t(82)=3.05; p < .001. And therefore, 
the FCE appeared to be almost twice as high for the case of 
the inconsistent choices as for the choices of the Universe, 
even though (what is worth emphasising) that there were 
twice less people choosing the Universe, and that they 
represented definitely “smaller minority” than the indecisive 
persons making inconsistent (mixed) choices. It means that 
we have to search for other explanations referring to the 
increased FCE in persons making the inconsistent choices. 
Anyway, we can talk here about something of a kind of 
Effect of Ontological Uncertainty (EOU) that is the doubts 
about the ontological status of the objects being compared. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
 If we assume, that we are dealing here with 
rather poorly investigated effect than with the artefact, 
it opens up a wide field for speculation and provokes 
as well as encourages the further researches on EOU 
determinants. Generally, all possible explanations may 
invoke in the first place either to (meta)cognitive factors or 
to emotional-motivational determinants (and personality). 
Let’s start from the cognitive level. It can be said that 
while performing a task, which requires making difficult 
choices, the respondents had to confront the situation of 
“ontological dilemma”. One should ask if by changing 
their primary choice in the following attempts, they would 
behave rationally or rather quite opposite. The change of 
the former position was the result of taking into account 
some other cognitive perspective (what was mentioned by 
some persons in their further statements) or an attempt to 
deal with the dilemma situation in a compromise manner. It 
would refer mostly to those few people (N=5), who always 
were choosing a different object from the tree comparable 
objects. It could be said, that people making the mixed 
choices acted contrary to the well-documented Commitment 
and Consistency Rule (Cialdini, 2001), which makes that 
we try to fit our further reactions to the previous behaviours 
and declarations. What is more, making the choice (and 
announcing of the decision) usually leads to intensification 
of the conviction about its accuracy. And although “being 
a consistent person” is connected with many psychological 
benefits (reduces the use of the resources), and yet from 
the cognitive point of view it is not rational strategy. 
Modification of the previous decisions or correction of the 
former choices seems to be more rational. It can also be 
a sign of bigger adaptability. But why otherwise rational 
strategy would lead to bigger distortions of the judgements, 
in terms of stronger overestimation of universality of one’s 
own options?  
 Anyway, the intriguing question returns – who 
are those people making the inconsistent (or maybe just 
changing) ontological choices? What makes them different 
from the remaining? Maybe those are the relativists, who 
know better than the others about arbitrariness of different 
FIGURE 1. Comparison of FCE magnitudes for persons 
making consistent (i.e. chosing always the same object) 
vs. inconsistent choices within psychology students, 
mathematics students and middle-aged adults
FIGURE 2. The average FCE values of persons making 
the inconsistent choices vs. persons choosing the Universe 
within the particular groups
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evaluations depending on the criteria resulting from the 
context or purpose of the comparisons made. Maybe those 
are people who are used to make use of many perspectives 
(points of view) regardless on the type of case, which is the 
subject of consideration and estimation? Perhaps people may 
be divided into mono-perspectivists and poli-perspectivists. 
By accepting more than one perspective, we start to see the 
limitation of each of them and (at least situationally) we 
become the relativists. It happens at the expense of feeling 
of obviousness and definiteness about the arising judgement 
or estimate. Referring to the task our respondents were 
confronted with, it would be the awareness that none of the 
single choices in the matter “What is the most real” is not 
entirely “real” or justified.  
 Relativistic thinking is often considered as a 
manifestation of reaching the postformal stage of cognitive 
development in post-Piagetian terms. It is also considered 
as one of the aspects of wisdom (Pascual-Leone, 1983, 
1990; Kramer, 2003; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000). It is 
characterised by awareness of relativity, uncertainty and 
often by paradoxical nature of reality as well as awareness 
of logical thinking limitations with reference to solving 
complex human problems. It is accompanied by awareness 
of subjectivity of knowledge and inability to direct and 
thorough recognition of the world, unfiltrated by the 
gained concepts and current knowledge (Kramer, 2003). 
Relativistic thinking justifies modification of the previous 
decisions resulting from “limited certainty” about one’s own 
judgements, consequently leading to so-called inconsistent 
choices. It doesn’t explain though why the relativistic 
inclinations would have increased FCE, in other words lead 
to overestimation of one’s own statement about ontological 
matters that is EOU. Especially since Bauman and Geher 
(2003) researches have shown that FCE is getting smaller 
if the respondents had been presented with different points 
of view of different matters prior to the test.  
 Trying to understand EOU we can also shift our 
attention towards the factors of emotional-motivational 
and personality features. Perhaps people making the mixed 
choices are characterized by higher level of neuroticism, 
and “changeability of decision” is connected with 
emotionally disturbed balance of mind, impulsiveness 
as well as excessive self-criticism and low self-esteem. 
While focusing on the individual differences one should 
necessarily take into account uncertainty orientation, 
treated as a constant disposition of personality and cognitive 
style as well as correlated with it Big Five dimension that 
is openness to experience (Hodson & Sorrentino, 1999). 
The fact that different people are uncertainty reduction-
oriented at different degrees and also that it results in 
numerous motivational and social consequences, which was 
indicated in many researches (see Hogg, 2007). It seems 
that low self-esteem, which is not necessarily understood as 
declared self-assessment but rather treated as implicit self-
esteem that is determined by implicit measures, is related 
with uncertainty. In colloquial language the opposite of a 
self-confident person is a shy one.  
 Both directions of investigations to answer the 
question: “Who are the people making the inconsistent 
choices”, lead to the concept of uncertainty. And although 
uncertainty can result from different reasons and refer to 
different matters, yet it seems to be key issue. Uncertainty 
can be anchored in meta-cognition that our knowledge 
is limited and therefore different statement about the 
same matter may also be justified because “it depends”. 
It can also be anchored in low self-esteem. Regardless of 
the origins and causes of uncertainty, its consequences 
can be similar – they increase motivation in order to 
reduce it. Overestimation of universality of one’s own 
preferences performs such a function that is by reducing 
uncertainty it protects self-assessment, which is sensitive 
to depreciation, and reduces discomfort. Looking at the 
issue from a genetic (developmental) point of view, one 
can come to the conclusion that being the relativist and 
habitual consideration of many points of view is, in fact, 
more sophisticated in cognitive way strategy of dealing 
with uncertainty. Generalized feeling of uncertainty and 
self-incompetence, in other words low self-esteem, can 
motivate also to more careful, more “defensive” (because 
regarding different points of view), relativistic processing 
of information. An opposite strategy would be dogmatic and 
stiff following of radically simplified, black and white view 
of the world that is offered by radical ideologies.  
 The carried out research showed unequivocally that 
FCE is also present with reference to ontological matters, 
regardless character of a group, its participants’ sex and age. 
More specifically, FCE was present both among students 
(young adults) and also among middle-aged people. And 
although it is difficult to find here any direct comparisons, 
it seems that this aspect of ontological decisions, which 
was a subject of our study, “produces” even stronger effect 
of overestimation of one’s own universality than in a case 
of the research regarding less basic matters. Perhaps it is 
caused by bigger information shortfall about the views of 
other people, in other words, bigger uncertainty. If EOU – 
which is revealed despite the lack of expectations on our 
part – is manifested by the inconsistent choices, it suggests 
that FCE magnitude is a function of uncertainty degree.   
 And although uncertainty (especially situational) 
may be the effect of the cognitive factors, yet the explanations 
of FCE magnitude (and its adaptational function) should be 
found rather within motivational factors.  
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
 Considering the fact that the most interesting yet 
unexpected result of the reported researches turned out to 
be EOU, interpreted in categories of uncertainty, the further 
research need to check if it will be possible to replicate 
this effect with reference to other important objects, being 
compared with respect to the same question: which one 
seems for you to be more real? Undoubtedly, it is worth to 
control the degree of subjective certainty of the respondents 
after the choice has been made and assessed in terms of its 
universality. It would be advisable to simplify the procedure 
and to allow the respondents to use an option in kind of “I 
have no opinion”.  
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 In view of the obtained results, there seems to 
be the crucial concept of uncertainty.  More specifically, 
different aspects and kinds of uncertainty, whether 
understood situationally or treated as a constant disposition 
of personality, as well as tolerance of uncertainty and 
preferred strategies of uncertainty reduction. Uncertainty 
may relate to a to a specific domain or have non-specific 
character, somehow generalised, as the result of an overall 
assessment of one’s own competences and sense of self-
esteem. Therefore future studies should control these features 
or personality dispositions, which relation to uncertainty 
seems likely, though not obvious. We mean such variables as 
level and stability of self-esteem, fear and neuroticism, the 
concept of self-efficacy, clarity of one‘s own social identity 
and perceived social support as well as need for cognitive 
closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Another variable, 
which is also associated with certainty vs. uncertainty, 
would be conviction that the others share or don’t share our 
vision of reality (Kashima, Kashima, Bain et. al., 2010). 
We learn about this particularly while communicating. Last 
but not least we should nesesarilly mention on existential-
phenomenological approach (Mudyń, 2012 and the notion 
of ontological security introduced by R. D. Laing in his 
classical work The Divided Self (1960). 
 Anyway, the differences within the range of 
individual ontological orientations still seem an issue that is 
intriguing and little surveyed. Paraphrasing the statement of 
Queen of Hearts from Alice’s Adventure in Wonderland, it is 
tempting to say that ordinary people are also able to imagine 
six non-existent things and believe in their existence, even 
before breakfast. They are also able to deny the reality 
of objects, which are not interesting or not important for 
them. The fact that the Universe was hardly ever chosen 
as ‘the most real object’, convinces us that the whole can 
be understood as less real than its component parts; and 
also that - time after time - logic loses to the clarity of the 
imposing  notions. 
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